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Abstract: Throughout the second half of the 20th Century, urbanization, new technologies, rapid 
labor-saving productivity growth in primary industries, and improved highways combined to 
create large-scale rural-urban functionally integrated regions. These forces have raised the stakes 
for regions in their pursuit of economic development and growth, making successful regional 
policy even more important. Changes to the governance structures consistent with the increased 
interdependence within broad rural-urban regions will improve the region's competitiveness; 
adopting fad-based approaches and policies aimed at “picking winners” will be less fruitful. 
Going forward, continuing globalization and environmental sustainability have the potential to 
fundamentally reshape relative regional attractiveness.  
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Introduction 
The places where people live, work, shop, and recreate, forming functional economic 
regions, are the essential entities for economic analysis and policy. These are the building blocks 
of economic growth, where "the rubber hits the road," in terms of economic development 
strategies. In turn, prosperity of the mega-region is essential to providing economic 
opportunities, high quality public services, and a good quality of life for the resident population. 
Understanding how regional economies evolve and what makes them prosperous becomes even 
more essential in the post-2000 climate of sluggish economic growth in which job creation in 
local communities becomes paramount.  
In advanced economies, the geographical size of economic regions has greatly expanded 
since 1950 to encompass wide swaths of what were traditionally ‘rural’ areas. In the outer 
reaches of these expanded regions, areas that were once dependent on primary sector activities 
such as agriculture have evolved to having much more diverse rural economic bases. Labor-
saving technological changes have led primary sector employers to shed workers and 
consolidate, while transportation improvements have facilitated commuting between rural and 
urban areas. Households' retail expenditures are also conducted on a more regional scale. Small-
town shops have mostly either consolidated or been replaced by big-box stores with extensive 
regional market areas. Issues of planning, infrastructure, and land use encompass both urban 
areas and their exurban fringes. Clearly, practical distinctions between rural and urban areas have 
blurred as they have become more interdependent. 
Economists have documented how technological change and transportation improvements 
have led to the organic formation of large urban-centered regions. Yet, political discourse and 
media reports typically ignore this fundamental transformation of how economic activity is 
organized. They continue to invoke a rural-urban divide that is often based on landscape 
considerations rather than what the people are actually doing. For example, a New York Times 
2008 Editorial lamented that the Presidential candidates were focused too much on ‘rural’ issues 
such as subsidizing ethanol production, while not paying close enough attention to ‘urban’ issues 
2 
 
 
 
such as “education, housing, health care, jobs, transportation and environment,” as if those are 
only ‘urban’ issues. This lack of awareness means that there have been few institutional and 
governance changes to reflect the rise of mega regions across North America—local 
communities compete with their neighbors for economic development and provision of public 
services, rather than working together in their mutual interests. Indeed, North American regions 
are still using governance designed in the “horse-and-buggy” era to compete in the 21st Century.  
The current phase of globalization, beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the 1980s, is 
another pervasive reality affecting the spatial location of economic activity. Globalization 
implies that product markets for goods and services are increasingly international. Capital flows 
are more fluid and entrepreneurial talent is more footloose. One upshot is that across an 
increasing number of industries, individual firms are more mobile than ever. Globalization along 
with falling transportation costs makes it even more important for a particular region to be 
competitive in its bid to attract highly-mobile firms and households that have a wide range of 
location choices. Cities and communities used to compete with their immediate neighbors. Now 
they compete globally. Winners (losers) do not just gain (lose) capital, workers, and 
entrepreneurs from their neighbors, but they now potentially gain from (lose to) the entire world, 
magnifying the benefits (costs) of (not) achieving a competitive edge.  
In this article, we explore the evolving nature and rising importance of regions. First, in order 
to understand how regions can maximize their competitiveness as a location of choice in the 
global arena, we need to be able to define regions and understand how they have evolved, 
especially since the middle of the 20th Century. Second, we explore the recent history of regional 
economic development policies. The findings are not very encouraging. Rather than cooperating 
on economic development and service provision, individual communities within regions still 
compete with one another in, at best, zero-sum games. In particular, communities too often 
engage in wasteful economic competition using expensive tax incentives and subsidies to attract 
favored industries. It is not clear that there are widespread benefits in the winning regions, as 
they may be forced to reduce services or raise taxes on the rest of the region’s residents and firms 
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to offset the tax breaks (or subsidies) they gave to favored firms. Such a problem is exacerbated 
if the competition is intra-regional, where economic activity is simply rearranged without 
creating any new wealth—e.g., suburbs competing with a core city. Another problem is that local 
communities engage in sensational fad-based efforts rather than more successful and sustainable 
endeavors. Recent “flavor of the month” endeavors include attracting bio-technology firms, 
cluster-based policy, and today’s latest craze—green jobs. The problem is that politicians and 
economic developers have a dubious track record in picking the next 'hot' industry and simply 
copying everyone else is neither very innovative nor strategic. Governments should focus more 
on functions that are best done by governments (education, infrastructure, environmental 
protections, etc), leaving the private sector to focus on what it does best.  
If regions are currently not generally engaging in productive competition, we ask what 
should regions be doing? The answer is to adopt more proactive regional governance models of 
consolidation and real collaboration that account for the wide range of socioeconomic spillovers 
evident in their regions, and to take advantage of the scale economies in service and 
infrastructure provision. Second, rather than subscribing to the current fashion of trying to attract 
outside firms, they should build from within through retention, expansion, and supporting local 
entrepreneurship. Reinforcing this point is that diverse local economies typically outperform 
those highly concentrated in one industry. To pick an extreme case, was Gary Indiana’s 
concentration in the steel industry good for sustainable long-term growth (ditto for Detroit’s 
concentration in automobiles)? Building from within should lead to a more diverse economy 
than attracting one or two large outside firms/industries. Third, recognizing that knowledge will 
likely remain the catalyst for economic growth and innovation, regions with an attractive quality 
of life for high-skilled workers will have an advantage. We acknowledge that these approaches 
are fairly standard and not particularly tantalizing, but being patient and building a foundation is 
the best hope for regional competitiveness.  
We then examine the future of North America’s regions. Given that U.S. economic regions 
are currently unprepared for ongoing challenges, we wonder if regions are prepared for those 
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emerging in the future. For example, one expected future challenge is addressing the wide-
ranging impacts of climate change and environmental sustainability. Climate change will 
possibly reverse long term trends in U.S. regional growth, placing pressures on both origin and 
destination regions.   
We conclude by urging a more proactive set of policies to make American regions more 
competitive. As a starting point, we argue that federal and state/provincial efforts should focus 
on the realities of regional policy rather than continuing to conduct policy under the artificial 
distinction of “rural” and “urban.” Given the economic realities of the last 60 years, we propose 
the formation of a U.S. Department of Regional Development to consolidate the economic 
development functions of U.S. Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Rural Development, along with the myriad of other economic development 
functions taking place in the Commerce, Labor, and Transportation Departments. The resulting 
regional approach to policymaking will be more focused and better aligned to make North 
American regions, and thus the nation, competitive in the 21st Century and more likely to provide 
needed jobs for its citizens. 
How Have Regions Evolved? 
Regions can be defined in a great many ways to reflect particular perspectives. We take a 
'people-centric' view of regions appropriate to addressing issues of public service delivery, 
infrastructure development, planning, and economic development. We define a region as the 
geographic area that encompasses place of residence and place of work, and the geographic area 
within which everyday goods and services are purchased and basic public services are delivered. 
The resulting functional economic area (FEA) approach is by no means novel (Barkley 1995; 
Fox and Kumar 1965; Miller 1998; van Oort et al. 2010). The delineation of FEAs is strongly 
influenced by commuting patterns, whereas other spillovers that occur through factors such as 
the environment or infrastructure likely also correspond to these boundaries (e.g., due to sprawl, 
or placement of highways).  
A contrasting view held by many politicians and much of the media is that a region is defined 
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by the appearance of the landscape. In this view, if the landscape is agricultural, the region is 
agricultural; if the landscape is forested, it is a timber region, and so on. These physically 
descriptive notions of a region do not account for where the people work, shop, send their 
children to school, or engage in recreation—i.e., the spatial spillovers that are essential in our 
discussion below. Though these perspectives may have been more accurate 100 years ago, their 
persistence underlines the lack of understanding of how regions and regional economies have 
since evolved and the new opportunities and challenges that have emerged.  
We describe in this section two aspects of regional evolution that have somewhat 
paradoxically made (evolving) local regions even more important for determining 
competitiveness. First we illustrate the process of expanding regional boundaries as more and 
more rural space becomes functionally tied to focal urban centers. Second we describe the role of 
the information, communication, and technology (ICT) revolution and globalization in making 
regions more open, with more porous borders in terms of the exchange of goods and services. 
The result is larger, more open regions. However, rather than diminishing the importance of 
regions, these changes have made it even more important that regions employ astute internal 
management and improved connectivity with the rest of the world to improve its global 
competitiveness. 
Expanding Regions: Rural Space attaching to Urban Places 
Historically, the very existence and the growth of an urban center depended on the 
surrounding rural areas as farmers came to the town or city to buy goods and services (Christaller 
1933; Krugman 1991; Lösch 1954). The primary direction of causal growth has generally 
reversed itself for mature FEAs (Partridge et al. 2008; Ali et al. 2011).  In 1950, regional FEAs 
were geographically relatively small and fairly closed and discrete, dictated largely by relatively 
higher transportation costs. Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) document the more or less continually 
falling transportation costs in the U.S. since 1890.i Communication and information limitations 
further reduced access to goods, services and employment possibilities outside the region. In 
agriculture-dependent areas, farm holdings were relatively small. Dimitri et al. (2005) report 
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average farm size in the U.S. increased from 200 acres in 1950 to about 450 in 2001; 16% of the 
total labor force was employed as their primary job in agriculture in 1945, declining to 1.2% in 
2000. Commuting to non-farm employment was limited by the road network and the means of 
transport and farming technologies that were still relatively labor intensive—in 1945, 27% of 
farmers had off-farm employment, in 2003, 93% of farm households had off-farm employment 
(Dimitri et al. 2005). Technologies in nonfarm sectors were also consistent with smaller scale 
retail and commercial establishments (e.g., small hardware stores versus Home Depot), and the 
same was true in the provision of public services, such as education.  
Over the past 50-60 years, the geographic reach of FEAs and the nature of production and 
consumption within them have been fundamentally altered by changes in transportation and 
production technologies. The one-room country school, for example, has long since been 
replaced with much more highly specialized methods of education, segregated by age-group, 
area of study and particular needs. The corner grocery or hardware store has been largely 
replaced by big box retailers like Wal-Mart, Costco and Home Depot. Most agricultural 
production happens on very large commercial-size holdings, while small 'farms' are primarily 
lifestyle-choice residences for people with non-farm employment; 89% of the incomes of 'farm' 
households is earned off the farm (USDA 2010). Economies of size and scale have led to 
consolidation in many production processes, as well as the concentration of economic activities 
in or near successively larger urban centres (Partridge et al. 2008).  
Accompanying technological changes in production and transportation, many small towns in 
the Great Plains region of North America, for example, ceased to exist as they lost the threshold 
market size for a wide range of goods production and services provision. FEAs then reformed 
around larger regional centers, also translating into fewer, larger regions (Stabler and Olfert 
2002). These regions continue to expand geographically over time and evolve in response to 
trends that affect commuting and shopping patterns, and the related changes in threshold sizes 
described above.  
Using a comparative static framework and a clustering technique, Stabler and Olfert (2002) 
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examine the consolidation of the trade center system in the province of Saskatchewan in the 
Northern Great Plains region. Table 1 illustrates the consolidation process over the 1961-2002 
period, showing communities filtering downward in the trade centre hierarchy as they gradually 
lose market potential and as functions successively moved up to higher levels (Stabler and Olfert 
2002). Over time, larger and strategically-located places took up more and more functions and 
became focal points for regions that circumscribed commuting and shopping areas. Stabler and 
Olfert document a fundamental reorganization of regions in which there were 39 urban centers in 
the top three tiers of a six-tiered urban hierarchy in 1961, but only 18 in 2001. At the bottom of 
the hierarchy, less than half of the Province’s communities were in the lowest tier in 1961, but 
nearly 85% in 2002. Stabler and Olfert further show that the province’s economic geography has 
transformed itself to having 11 mega-regions, each with an urban anchor. 
As a consequence of the complex changes driven by new production and transportation 
technologies illustrated by this example, the borders of FEAs have extended outwards, and 
regional growth experiences have been closely tied to the size and vitality of their focal urban 
center (Drabenstott 2003; Partridge and Olfert 2009; Partridge et al. 2008; Renkow and Hoover 
2000; Stabler and Olfert 2002). The geographic 'diameters' of FEAs have increased with 
improvements in transportation, and a range of at-home labor-saving technologies and 
institutions. There is evidence that commuting sheds are larger around big urban centers (Ali et 
al. 2011; Goetz et al. 2010a; Renkow and Hoover 2000). More remote FEAs, or those with 
smaller focal urban centers, are experiencing population losses or slower growth that those that 
are more centrally located and/or with larger urban centers. Figure 1 illustrates the way in which 
commuting sheds have changed over a 20 year period (1981-2001) around a larger Canadian 
city, Edmonton Alberta. Higher degrees of commuting dependency have clearly extended 
outwards over even the 20 year period.  
The organic evolution of FEAs over time is also well-represented by the geographical growth 
of U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). The U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
defines MSAs as, "…one or more adjacent counties…that have at least one urban core area of at 
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least 50,000 population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic 
integration with the core as measured by commuting ties" (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Aside 
from the issue of defining and measuring the 'high degree of economic integration' (which in 
effect is having a 25% commuting rate to the urban core), this definition is consistent with our 
notion of FEAs. The evolution of the MSAs is illustrated by the fact that in each ten-year 
Census, many are redefined outward. MSAs of 1950 bear little resemblance to the current ones.  
The geographic extent of four representative metropolitan areas is illustrated in Panels A-D 
of figure 2. These four case studies include: sprawling Atlanta, Georgia; one from the slow 
growing “rustbelt” region—Columbus, Ohio; and two metropolitan areas from the slow-growing 
Great Plains region Des Moines, Iowa, and Minneapolis, Minnesota. The latter three cases 
illustrate that even in slow growing regions, MSAs have greatly expanded their geographical 
footprint.  
The Atlanta region (Panel A) clearly illustrates the effects of the construction of the Interstate 
highway system and other road improvements. The region expanded from 3 counties to 15 
between 1950 and 1973, a four-fold increase in area, followed by a corresponding increase to 28 
counties by 2003 (or about another doubling in geographical size). The growth process is similar 
for metropolitan Des Moines and Columbus even though they are less populated than Atlanta 
(table 2). Des Moines was about one-tenth the population of metropolitan Atlanta in 2009, while 
Columbus was about one-third its size. Minneapolis-St Paul MSA is a little slower growing 
geographically than the other cases. However, in all of these cases, the MSA boundaries 
understate the true growth of the respective regions which also include tightly-linked 
neighboring MSAs and micropolitan areas, combining to form even broader Combined 
Statistical Areas (CSAs), ‘mega’ regions in their respective states.ii  
Table 2 shows the type of growth processes that are common in these regional FEAs. 
Populations for three groupings of counties are shown: Group 1, those that were part of the MSA 
in 1950; Group 2, those that joined the MSA between 1950 and 1973; and Group 3, those that 
joined 1973-2003. The general pattern is a diminution over time of the relative size of the core 
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1950 Group 1 counties and a rise of the relative size of the Group 2 tier added 1950-1973. For 
example, in Atlanta MSA, Group 1’s population share declined from 62% in 1950 to 46% in 
2009, whereas the Group 2 share increased from 18% to 43%.  
Conversely, with the exception of Minneapolis-St. Paul, Group 3’s share was relatively 
constant over time, with its growth slightly lagging the overall metropolitan average. The slowest 
growing Group 3 (among our cases) was Des Moines with a growth rate of about 70% between 
1970 and 2003, To put this into perspective, between 1950 and 2000, the typical nonmetropolitan 
county grew by only 32%. Thus, even the most remote parts of these metropolitan areas grew 
considerably faster than their nonmetropolitan peers. What was happening to these counties is 
that they typically transformed themselves from a rural agriculture base to a base defined by 
commuting and market linkages to the core metropolitan area.  
To further illustrate the rural-urban diversity of the regions that have self-formed, Panel b of 
table 2 reports the population densities of the three county groups for each of the four case study 
MSAs. As these figures show, population density in the original Group 1 counties is much 
greater than in the other two groups, about 3 to 9 times that of Group 2 and about 15 to 20 times 
that of Group 3. The relative low density in parts of Group 2 and virtually all of Group 3 counties 
would explain why our stereotypical politician or major city newspaper writer may conclude 
from the agricultural landscape that these counties still rely on their 1950 economic base. 
Instead, by definition, the high commuting rates to the urban core illustrate the reality of Group 2 
and Group 3 counties being tightly linked to the urban center’s economy.  
Panel c of table 2 further illustrates the folly of simplistic conclusions based on confusing 
landscape with the economic activity of the residents. It reports for each of the three Groups in 
the four case study metropolitan areas, the percent of the population that lives in urbanized areas 
(roughly at least 1,000 people per square mile), nonfarm rural areas, and on rural farms.iii This 
panel clearly shows that the core 1950 Group 1 counties are the most urbanized with 94% to 
99% of the population living in urbanized areas, while the nonfarm rural population and 
especially the farm rural population were relatively small (farming did not account for more than 
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0.4% of Group 1 population in 2000). When interpreting the farm population figures, note this 
includes very “casual” farm households that derive very little income from farming. Overall, 
Groups 2 and 3 had much smaller urban populations, accounting for about 59 to 83% in Group 2 
and 40 to 52% of Group 3. Rural farm population share ranged from only 0.2 to 7% in Groups 2 
and 3 (even for Des Moines), with the balance being non-farm rural population.iv The low farm 
share illustrates that the people were engaged in other work activities in these outer regions. 
Regardless of the sparsely populated bucolic landscape, even relatively rural Groups 2 and 3 
counties had the character of “low density” suburbs tied to the urban core through the 
commuting behaviors of their residents. Indeed, these four case study regions show that the 
changes since 1950 are astounding. In 1950, urban centers were compact “islands” with 
relatively little connection to the rural hinterlands. Today, these islands have evolved into the 
foci of “mega” regions often four to seven times larger in geographical size than in 1950.  
The inclusion of more and more rural space within urban-centered regions illustrates the 
growing dependence of rural areas on the urban centers that dominate the regional economies 
(though this statement is factual, it bothers some rural stakeholders). This increased dependence 
implies increasing within-region cohesiveness that has evolved organically bottom-up. From a 
policy design or governance perspective, an understanding of this context and matching 
governance jurisdictions to the realities of functionally interdependent regions would seem 
crucial. Yet local government jurisdictions have changed very little, their static administrative 
boundaries not reflective of the economic realities (Andrew and Feiock 2010; Drabenstott et al. 
2004; Goetz et al. 2010a; Hammond and Tosun, 2011).v Even FEAs positioned around smaller 
urban areas would benefit from a governance structure where the geographic jurisdiction of the 
local government was consistent with the de facto regions in order to internalize current 
externalities and benefit from scale and threshold economies. Recognition of the regional 
transformations characterized by expanding 'virtual' boundaries and increased internal 
dependence of rural areas on urban centers is essential in policy design and evaluation. 
Open Regions: Increased Connections to Global Economies 
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The increasing dependence of rural areas on urban focal points within regions resulted 
largely from changes internal to the region that were triggered by transportation and production 
technology changes. At least as dramatic has been the information/communication (ICT) 
revolution, transforming access to (information about) producer and consumer goods and 
services, as well as employment opportunities. The magnitude of the ICT impact resulted, for 
example, in pronouncements that "The Earth is Flat" (Friedman 2005) and the "Death of 
Distance" (Cairncross 1995, 1997). The ICT revolution has altered the relationship between 
regional FEAs and the rest of the world, by making the region much more open.  
In a more open region, producers can create effective input-output linkages globally and, at 
the same time, local production must be competitive in a global setting. Consumers have 
instantaneous access to information about goods and services and prices anywhere in the world; 
the labor force has ready access to information about global employment opportunities. The 
growth of the "Knowledge Economy" has spawned new sectors as well as having an impact 
existing sectors, all intimately connected to global networks. Telecommuting is at least 
conceptually possible, though ICT technologies are thought by economists to complement face-
to-face contact (rather than serving as a substitute), or that these technologies actually support 
industries that require more face-to-face contacts (Sinai and Waldfogel 2004; McCann 2007).vi 
Consumers can and do spend incomes on goods and services as well as urban amenities in places 
far removed from the region where they reside.  
New external connections of more open FEAs are not necessarily with nearby places or even 
places on the same continent. While widespread globalization is not a new phenomenon, as 
indicated by the globalization of commodity markets in the 19th Century, these trends are having 
novel impacts on both the potential and the vulnerability of regional economies. Expressed in 
terms of a regional impact 'multiplier,' as an increasing proportion of regional income is spent 
outside the region (and often in other countries), the local multiplier will decrease. A government 
policy to subsidize the construction and use of wind turbines (for example) to benefit a region 
will have economic spillovers impacts along the supply chain for those who (say) manufacture 
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the components in China. Globalization means that beneficiaries of regional initiatives are less 
likely to be the region’s residents, and at the same time the region’s residents will increasingly be 
influenced by events far beyond their borders and beyond their control. Of course, such trends 
not only have implications for regional policies, but also help explain why (for example) a 
national stimulus package may have been much more successful in the comparatively closed 
economies of the 1930s.  
Free-flowing capital and the competition for knowledge workers intensify the international 
competition among FEAs. Greater Kansas City is not just competing with Greater St. Louis or 
Greater Omaha, but competes more than ever with faraway places such as Beijing and Baden-
Württemberg for capital, knowledge workers, and entrepreneurs. This competition means that if 
Kansas City wins (loses) this economic competition, they are not only going to pull (lose) 
capital, entrepreneurs, and knowledge workers from just their historic competitors St. Louis or 
Omaha, but also from the rest of the world.  
In our discussion, we have shown how rural parts of FEAs have become more economically 
linked to their urban core, and at the same time, have become more interdependent with the rest 
of the world. The geographically expanded FEAs are 'thinner' near their borders as the newly 
‘incorporated’ rural areas play a role akin to low density suburbs, and the borders are 
increasingly porous, leaving the region open to the rest of the world beyond its traditional nearby 
competitors. 
Regions Matter More than Ever in the 21st Century 
The patterns described above suggest that regions and their characteristics are likely to 
become more important, as the agility with which entrepreneurs, capital, and knowledge workers 
relocate from lagging to preferred regions increases. With more mobile resources, policymakers' 
understanding of the dynamics of regions takes on added importance, as the smallest advantages 
(disadvantages) are magnified in their effects on the region’s prosperity (Thisse 2010). The 
region's success in being 'picked' as the location of choice for households and firms is of critical 
importance for the survival and prosperity of the region. 
13 
 
 
 
While regions expand in size and become more open, the spatial configuration within which 
individuals live, work and conduct their day-to-day expenditures is still discrete and has 
physiological limits. In an early discussion of FEAs, Fox and Kumar (1965) assert that the 
maximum time a typical person is willing to spend commuting is one-hour each way. As 
particularly road transportation has improved, the geographic distance consistent with a one hour 
commute has expanded somewhat (Ali et al. 2011; Anderson 2002; Eliason et al. 2003; 
Rouwendal 1999). However, the daily time constraint is relatively immutable, including time at 
work and time for sleeping, eating, and personal maintenance. Likewise, as rising wages increase 
the opportunity costs of commuting time, there are limits to the geographic extent of a region. 
Indeed van Oort et al. (2010) point to very stable commuting times over 20 years in the 
Netherlands.  
There are further practical reasons for regions to continue to matter. For instance, 
infrastructure decisions of governments and the investment decisions of firms are by definition 
site-specific and these decisions will, in turn, continue to be very important for the regional 
population. And while external “global” connections are increasingly important, core activities 
of employment, day-to-day shopping, children attending school, access to health services happen 
for the most part within the FEA. Thus, the daily lives of individuals continue to be strongly 
influenced by regional economic conditions.  
We have shown how economic development is now a regional concern as the link between 
place of work and place of residence has long been cut, creating the need for broader economic 
development and transportation strategies, and land use planning that reflects the actual regions 
that people live, work, recreate, etc. However, it is important to be aware of regional 
characteristics as well as the potential and limitations of various regional development strategies. 
In understanding this context, we now turn first to the suboptimal economic development 
practices that permeate the current policy landscape, saving for section 4 how regional policies 
should be developed, given the realities we have described. 
Suboptimal Policies and Current Economic Development Responses. 
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Regions participate in economic growth differentially. Space still matters (Leamer 2007) and 
economic growth happens at particular sites with either natural advantages (access to ports, 
natural amenities) or access to urban agglomeration economies. Factors that influence growth are 
not ubiquitous and that means that not all regions can realistically expect to participate equally in 
the growth process. There is a natural evolution of regional comparative advantage with changes 
in technology and market demand. For example, textiles were the ‘hot’ mid-19th Century 
industry, centered in New England. However, as the production technology changed, textile 
firms migrated first to the low-wage rural South and then abroad. Of course, this process left 
historic New England mill towns in economic distress until new industries filled the void. The 
new industries are typically higher paying than textiles and New England remains a prosperous 
location in many dimensions despite the loss of what was the key industry of the mid-19th 
Century. In fact, the economics literature is full of examples of communities recovering from 
economic shocks, illustrating that if a community has a good foundation, it can be very resilient 
to economic shocks.vii Nonetheless, despite the clear aggregate macroeconomic advantages of 
resources flowing to more productive or lower-cost locations, such evolutions have resulted in 
attempts by those not favored by this adjustment process, or by senior governments with a 
mandate to address regional inequality, to try to stem natural market trends by supporting 
declining regions. These interventions have typically had unintended consequences and are 
usually expensive. 
One problem with addressing regional inequalities is that the decision is inherently political 
and the resulting policies and processes often run counter to economic fundamentals. For 
example, trying to help remote regions in decline is often very expensive with high opportunity 
costs and can reduce aggregate growth when resources are diverted from more productive 
regions with agglomeration economies to sparsely-settled regions that lack them (Polèse and 
Shearmur 2006). Indeed, such growth-reducing effects are why the World Bank (2009) called for 
greater use of spatially neutral policies to encourage growth in locations where it will be most 
productive (which they argued was large cities).  
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Reducing broader multi-province or multistate regional inequalities is primarily a concern of 
national governments—e.g., addressing the persistent poverty in Appalachia or in Atlantic 
Canada, or addressing the massive population loss in the Great Plains of North America. If 
intervention in an attempt to reduce regional disparities does not produce a strong endogenous 
growth response, it will likely reduce national income or slow needed adjustments from low to 
high productivity regions. Worse yet are responses in which, firm, industry or sector policies are 
disguised as broad-based regional development policies designed for entire regional population. 
Too often such policies merely support rent seeking by local elites rather than helping the 
broader population (Storper and Mannville 2006). Section 4 will describe when interventions are 
justified on an economic basis.  
We assume that a common goal for the vast majority of communities, cities, and regions is 
the availability of diverse economic opportunities with high income levels and/or quality of 
life.viii Though not always the case, these economic opportunities are typically associated with 
population and employment growth, especially in the slow growth of the early 21st Century. In 
pursuit of this goal, communities and their broader regions strive to advance their strengths to 
attract new firms and enhance economic opportunities. At the national level, if it is effective, this 
constant competition among regions should increase aggregate productivity by improving 
regional productivity and encouraging resources to flow to higher productivity regions.  
If the inter- and intra-regional competition is conducted in an inefficient manner, it could 
lead to wasteful overbidding for new firms. In this case, it could be a negative sum game from 
the nation’s perspective. Further, from the receiving region’s (or community’s) perspective, it 
may be wasteful and futile in terms of long term, sustained growth. A key feature of wasteful 
competition is that it encourages firms to relocate away from their most productive location. 
This wasteful competition (or “winner’s curse”) too often entails a series of incentives and 
subsidies that have the opportunity cost of the lower taxes or better services that may have 
instead been more beneficial to the receiving region’s residents (e.g., Burstein and Rolnick 
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1994).ix Further exacerbating matters is the firm’s origin region now has more unemployment 
and less tax revenue to address its needs. We now consider wasteful competition in more detail. 
The Reliance on Fad-Based and Inefficient Policy. 
Local economic development initiatives are often attached to the latest economic 
development fad. Johnson (2007) describes these fads as typically associated with one particular 
guru, whose claims and recommendations are somewhat vague, whose ideas promise broad 
applicability and easy-to-follow recipes. There is usually very little empirical research basis to 
support the craze aside from charming anecdotes. However, Johnson points out that there is 
usually a kernel of truth in the attraction of the fad, which is why it typically catches on. Fads 
that have had widespread appeal at some point since the 1990s include recreating the next 
Silicon Valley (Silicon Prairie, Silicon Tundra, etc), bio-technology, value-added manufacturing, 
attracting immigrants to declining areas or (more recently) attracting creative class and 
bohemians. Perhaps that most prominent fad over the entire period has been clusters, which 
persists despite limited empirical support. Today the rush to green jobs is in vogue, which has 
also taken off with very little solid research to support the notion that ‘clean’ jobs will be a major 
net jobs creator (which is not to say that environmental sustainability is unimportant!).  
The underlying notion of most economic development fads is that government policymakers 
can find the next ‘hot’ industry and divine its ideal location. This implies that policymakers are 
particularly adept at identifying what will be the future strategic industries and their locational 
requirements. Illustrating the difficulty of picking the hot firm or industry, economists have long 
known that beating the financial market average is difficult as recently illustrated by the 
wreckage of the dot.com bubble, the housing bubble, and the financial derivatives bubbles. As 
Princeton economist Burton Malkiel (2003) colorfully put it, a blind folded monkey could 
perform as well as most stock pickers. The point is that if expert stock pickers have an 
exceedingly difficult time, it is unclear how inexperienced economic developers or politicians 
would do any better at picking winners. 
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There is no shortage of examples of failures by local economic development professionals in 
picking the next growth industry and its ideal location. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) provide well-
known examples of failings of government leaders in picking industries despite an abundance of 
confidence in the new fashion at the time—e.g. the much vaunted efforts of Japan’s MITI, U.S. 
efforts to develop alternative energy in the in the 1970s such as oil shale, or the misplaced efforts 
in the last decade to build biotechnology clusters. Further, in their efforts to develop the next hot 
sector, politicians and economic development professionals often offer tax incentives and 
subsidies. Indeed, while economists talk about the costs of tax incentives such as shifting 
resources from productive uses to sectors with lower productivity (and/or higher taxes and lower 
public services to pay for the incentives), politicians and economic development professionals 
persist in efforts to support sectors/firms that the market would not do alone. 
What then explains why policymakers make proposals such as promoting wind energy in 
places that are not windy, proposing solar farms in places that are not sunny, or build 
biotechnology clusters in places that have no chance of success? First, it is not literally 
impossible for a region to develop a competitive advantage in a particular sector—e.g., the 
Research Triangle in Raleigh-Durham comes to mind—but the costs can be very high and the 
odds of success are very low as demonstrated by the scores who have tried and failed to replicate 
the Research Triangle or Silicon Valley. Yet, the low odds of success leads us to conclude that 
policymakers are either overconfident or (more likely) believe they will not be held accountable 
for their failings. Second, politicians are under so much pressure to create jobs to improve their 
chances of reelection that they feel compelled to demonstrate that they are doing “something,” 
even if that means following the latest craze with very little likelihood of success. Offering tax 
breaks and incentives to just about everything also allows politicians the opportunity to claim 
credit for positive economic events even if their actions had very little to do with the actual 
outcome. 
A third reason is that economic development professionals are judged by brokering ‘deals’ 
they can sign and whether they appear to have a ‘progressive’ forward-looking agenda. While 
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landing big companies with massive subsidies and tax breaks may not improve the community's 
overall or long term well being, sticking to tried and true basics is not sensational or 
‘progressive’ and takes time and patience to realize results. Of course, patience is not a virtue of 
politicians up for reelection after making bold promises of new jobs. Likewise, landing a big 
company can quickly help the development professional (or politician) move on to their next job 
before the costs of their actions are fully realized. Generally, economists do not fully appreciate 
the incentive compatibility problem between the personal utility function of professional 
economic developers and the needs of the community at large.  
Because the cluster fad has been so prominent in economic development, we spend some 
time discussing it to illustrate both the attraction of these temporary distractions and their 
downfall. Clusters are a hybrid of the sectoral policies described above and are associated with 
the Harvard management expert Michael Porter. He defines a cluster as “…a geographically 
proximate group of companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by 
commonalities and complementarities” (Porter 1998, p. 198). So, for example, a grouping of 
health service companies could be a medical cluster, or a grouping of biotech firms a 
biotechnology cluster, or a grouping of tourist sites such as those around a gambling casino could 
be an entertainment cluster. 
As with other fads, there is a kernel of truth in the cluster arguments. Indeed, Porter’s notion 
of clusters is actually quite old as economists dating back to the 19th Century have described the 
workings of localization economies (Martin and Sunley 2003; Duranton et al. 2010). Though not 
as alluring as the term ‘clusters,’ localization economies is the simple notion that proximate 
firms in a given industry and supply chain can take advantage of closer proximity to customers 
and suppliers, better attract a labor force, or capture spillovers from emulating successful 
competitors.x  
Economists typically find that doubling the relative size of a given industry within a region is 
associated with a 3-8% increase in that industry’s productivity, about the same size as the effect 
of urbanization economies (Duranton et al., 2010; Puga 2010). Because urbanization economies 
19 
 
 
 
apply to all firms in a region versus just the firms that are part of the ‘cluster,’ the scale of its 
impact would be across the broader economy benefitting all or most residents, not just the 
workers associated with the cluster.  
The criticisms against cluster policies are numerous and include the lack of systematic 
evidence that cluster development policies have positive effects. A key criticism is that the 
definitions of clusters are so vague that they cannot be applied on a consistent basis across 
regions, while the heterogeneity across clusters further makes it impossible to draw general 
policy rules from their success or failings (Martin and Sunley 2003; Duranton et al. 2010).xi It is 
really unsatisfying that the success of clusters is measured by the notion “you know it when you 
see it.”  
A second criticism is that promoting a cluster too often requires the use of subsidies or tax 
breaks, which have opportunity costs for the broader regional economy. Further, after identifying 
(and subsidizing) a cluster, who knows whether it will experience a downward spiral? In a worst-
case scenario, the demise of Detroit’s automotive cluster brought the whole region down 
illustrating how the resources would be better expended diversifying the entire Detroit region, 
not just supporting a cluster that is on the verge of becoming uncompetitive. Clustering also 
further concentrates a region’s economic activity in the industries within the given cluster, while 
the evidence suggests that more diverse economies have better economic outcomes (Glaeser et 
al., 1992; Partridge and Rickman, 1995; Duranton et al., 2010).  
Perhaps most telling is that even if successful, a cluster is unlikely to have much of an effect 
on the region. Duranton et al. (2010) show that doubling the size of a cluster (which would be a 
remarkable policy success) would only lead to about a 2% increase in wages and that this effect 
would be limited to those workers employed in the cluster. This is certainly not a transformative 
event for the region’s workers outside of the cluster. Finally, a typical finding is that an 
industry’s local growth is inversely associated with its initial relative share (e.g., Desmet and 
Fafchamps 2005; Partridge et al. 2008). That is, there is a reversion to the mean effect where 
relatively large sectors (the clusters) tend to grow less than the regional average, perhaps because 
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of the greater competition for customers and inputs in bigger clusters. Indeed, such a finding 
might explain why Feser et al. (2008) found that technological-based clusters in the Appalachian 
region were not associated with subsequent employment growth.   
Why does it matter? Despite the dubious empirical support for cluster policies, they are 
widely used around the world as a leading economic development tool. Moreover, the concept 
has been recently recycled by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Small Business 
Administration in the form of “Regional Innovation Clusters” to promote regional economic 
growth.xii While we agree that regional approaches are generally optimal for promoting growth, 
the consensus among economists is that cluster approaches are misguided and divert scarce 
resources away from higher valued uses. Perhaps more importantly, the focus on clusters diverts 
resources from broader-based efforts that consider the full range of sectors, an approach that 
would likely be effective. Efforts like supporting clusters may produce short-term “successes” 
such as increases in networking or meetings, but are unlikely to promote long-term growth 
unless the economic fundamentals are supportive of the cluster (which raises the question of why 
development policy was needed in the first place). Thus, while good economic development 
policy should promote or market a region’s advantages including organically formed clusters, 
efforts to artificially 'build' clusters are likely to be unsuccessful, especially when these efforts 
come at the expense of broader-based efforts aimed to help the entire community, not just the 
cluster.  
The arguments against clusters promotion as an economic development policy can be 
extended to most other fads. To translate into real economic development, these efforts would 
require (on the part of the policymaker) intimate knowledge about the details of the next growth 
industry. They would also require clairvoyance about whether other countries will eliminate a 
particular region's competitiveness (e.g., India’s gains in software are one reason why U.S. 
information sector employment has recently declined). Indeed, the hot industry of the late-1980s 
and 1990s for industry targeting was the information sector including ‘dot.coms’ (information 
includes software and telecommunications). Even as it was the so-called “can’t miss” future 
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growth industry of that era, between its peak in March 2001 and August 2010, U.S. information 
employment declined by 27.1%, while total nonfarm employment only declined 1.8%.xiii Even if 
a sector is poised for growth, policymakers still need to know which individual firms (and their 
managements) will prosper and where they will prosper. Further complicating matters is that 
even if a sector is growing, there are still questions about which technologies will succeed. For 
example, what types of biotechnology will flourish, or will fuel cells be the next technology for 
automobiles vs. other technologies, and so on. Politicians and economic development 
professional are unlikely to be well-positioned to know these answers.  
Selecting individual firms for tax incentives and tax subsidies is a key component in 
implementing cluster policy, sectoral policy, or other state and local economic development 
policies. The vast majority of related literature argues that individually selected tax incentives for 
firms are ineffective at increasing local prosperity (e.g., Burstein and Rolnick 1994; Holmes 
1995; Gabe and Kraybill 2002; Peters and Fisher 2002; Bondonio and Greenbaum 2007; Glaeser 
and Gottlieb 2008; Lee, 2008; Goetz et al. forthcoming). This is in contrast to a more widely 
accepted alternative view that a more neutral policy of across the board low rates of business 
taxes can lead to greater economic activity. For example, Bartik (1991, p. 43) estimates that a 
10% across-the-board reduction in state or metropolitan area business taxes will increase that 
area’s economic activity 1 to 6%.  
Greenstone and Moretti (2004) and Greenstone et al. (2010) are two papers that challenge the 
notion that tax incentives to individual firms are necessarily “bad.” They examine the location of 
large facilities (so-called ‘million dollar plants’) and compare various firm/place outcomes to the 
outcomes of the ‘losers’ that did not win the competition. The losers are among the finalists with 
the winner for the location of the million dollar plant as identified by the trade publication Site 
Selection Magazine. We do not dispute the author’s empirical results, but we are skeptical of 
their identifying assumption. Basically, our point can be made using the same example used by 
Greenstone et al. (2010): i.e., BMW’s 1992 decision to locate a large facility in Greenville-
Spartanburg, South Carolina versus the reported ‘loser’ Omaha, Nebraska. Greenstone et al.’s 
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(2010) identifying assumption is that the ‘loser’ is like the winner in every key dimension except 
that the winner ‘won’ the plant—i.e., without the million dollar plant, they would have equal 
performance. Thus, comparing (or differencing) the ex post outcomes would tell us the effect of 
locating the plant because the loser acts as the counterfactual.  
Despite Greenstone et al.’s (2010) examination of some pre- and post-location decision 
trends, our view is that it is entirely possible if not highly likely that the firm (and its site 
selection consultants) is more strategic than just ranking the winner and loser based on their 
economic fundamentals. In particular, would not the firm consider its own profits rather than just 
the community’s relative economic fundamentals? Indeed, a strategic profit maximizing firm 
likely keeps a set ‘losers’ in the mix because the losers were offering very generous incentives, 
even if the losers had very weak economic fundamentals. In this way, the firm could use the 
loser’s bid as a way to extract greater rents from the winner. Such a possibility is further 
supported because the firm will understand its profitability better than the communities who are 
doing the bidding.  
In the case of BMW, why would Omaha ever be the runner up in a competition for BMW? 
Omaha has no strong access to the auto supply chain. It is not geographically close to the major 
markets, or to a port for importing of European components, or exporting vehicles. Across the 
United States, was Omaha truly the next best alternative for BMW? Or was Omaha left in the 
mix because it offered very generous tax incentives and it allowed BMW to secure a better deal 
from Greenville-Spartanburg? Is it possible that ‘losers’ are losers for a reason? We believe that 
a comparison to the nation as a whole is actually an adequate counterfactual assuming one 
controls for the conditioning variables. Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp, 69-77) argue that such 
matching strategies employed by Greenstone et al. (2010) would produce results that are mainly 
the same as standard instrumental variables (IV) or ordinary least squares (OLS) strategies. Any 
difference is that matching strategies put more weight on the ‘treated’ observations and standard 
regression approaches put more weight on cases where there are nearly equal cases of treated and 
untreated observations. Indeed, Greenstone et al. (2010) find that when using all U.S. counties, 
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the winning counties had a small relative decrease in Total Factor Productivity, which we find 
more realistic.xiv 
Nonetheless, we believe that the most appropriate counterfactual to offering firm-specific 
targeted tax incentives is offering across the board lower taxes for all businesses. Implementing 
across-the-board lower overall business taxes (or better services), which does not require oracle-
level information about the future growth industries or about the nonlinearities of localization or 
urbanization economies, is much more likely to be successful. Likewise, if the goal is 
employment creation, new jobs tax credits that treat all firms equally would more directly 
address the stated objective than picking firms. 
To illustrate the point that ‘landing’ big million dollar facilities is unlikely to lead to strong 
growth, Panel a of Figure 3 plots 2008-2010 state job growth on the number of per-capita 
million-dollar facilities announced for the 2005-2007 period from Site Selection Magazine. Then 
to consider employment growth in the last year prior to the Great Recession and the first year 
after the Great Recession, Panel b reports 2006-07 employment growth on announced 2005 
facilities and Panel c reports 2009-10 employment growth on announced 2008 facilities. We also 
point out some interesting state cases. When interpreting these numbers, two factors likely 
mechanically increase (positively) the correlation. First, firms are most likely to expand or open 
large facilities in states that they expect to grow regardless of the plant expansion. Second, we 
likely are capturing some construction, and this typically has large employment effects. 
Nonetheless, the correlation is always near zero and statistically insignificant. Indeed, we tried 
other years and the correlation was always near zero (both positive and negative) and never 
statistically significant regardless of considering all facilities or million dollar manufacturing 
facilities (because they might spur the location of other suppliers).xv  
We are careful to not infer causation from these regressions, but it is very clear that being the 
big ‘winner’ in luring million dollar plants is not a transformative event. Yet, landing big plants 
receives a vast share of the attention from politicians and economic developers. Our findings are 
consistent with Lee’s (2008) findings that manufacturing relocations are a minute share of 
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manufacturing job growth and that incentives play very little role in their decision to relocate. 
Later, we will describe strategies with better prospects than trying to land mega-projects.   
Again, we ask why do politicians and economic development professionals engage in tax 
incentives if their success rate is so low? A key reason is the incentive compatibility problem that 
residents do not have full information regarding the effects of alternative policies. Conversely, 
economic professionals get ‘promoted’ to their next job by cutting deals and the full costs, 
including the recognition of failed policies, may not be apparent for many years. The political 
economy of tax incentives is very similar to the political economy of trade policy. That is, voters 
do not fully recognize the lower prices due to imports and voters do not know which exporter 
thrived due to free trade, but they can identify a plant closure in a newly uncompetitive industry. 
Analogously, the firms benefiting from across the board tax cuts, many of which would be small 
businesses below the radar, would be invisible to voters. Cutting of ribbons by politicians, in 
contrast, is highly visible when they ‘land’ a big firm with tax incentives. Also, like the 
international trade political economy literature, another reason for tax incentives is that local 
governments are under extreme lobby pressure by rent-seeking ‘loser’ industries that survive 
only with favorable treatment (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007), while profitable industries do 
not need such support.xvi 
Effective Regional Strategies for the 21st Century 
The appeal of the fad is that it promises a quick and easy fix. Effective strategies, on the 
other hand, tend to be tedious and typically need to be nurtured over a sustained time period. 
Conceptually, the task is one of becoming the region of choice for households and firms in their 
location decisions based on utility and profit-maximizing motivations respectively. Practically 
the region's mission is to maximize the probability that it will be chosen by successful 
businesses, and let the households and firms sort themselves into preferred locations. Of course, 
this process can entail aggressively marketing the strengths of a region including its schools, 
infrastructure, human capital, regulatory and tax environment, and the organic formation of 
clusters that may or may not be expanding. In this environment, all firms large and small 
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regardless of industry have an equal chance to prosper based on the economic fundamentals. 
This stands in contrast to 'picking the industry' for the particular region and then diverting 
resources from other sectors in the region to promote this favored existing or anticipated industry 
(e.g., green energy, a particular cluster, or a retail development favored by local elites).   
Note that advocating limiting subsidies and tax breaks may appear as though we are 
proposing a limited role for governments. That is not true and it is likely the opposite. 
Governments providing good governance are the core of effective regional strategies for the 21st 
Century. Governments are indispensible in performing what are well-understood government 
functions: the provision of public services (education, information, security) and infrastructure, 
and ensuring that the regulatory framework is both adequate to protect (public and private) 
property and individuals and does not stifle growth and development. Providing good schools 
and infrastructure, and performing their functions efficiently and effectively actually requires a 
relatively active government, but one focused on the activities that are best accomplished by 
governments, avoiding venturing into activities that are best left to the private sector. 
Governments do not have a good track record in private sector activities. Indeed, well-informed 
voters (and media) may be what are needed for officials to implement good policy, meaning 
voters need to understand what governments can and cannot do for local development. In this, 
we are reminded of the role Ross Perot played in American politics in 1992 of informing voters 
of the costs of high government budget deficits and the tradeoffs involved in reducing them. If 
local jobs are important to voters, such teachable moments would seem to have high payoffs. 
In designing a successful regional strategy, then the first question is what does it take to be 
the chosen region by firms and households in a globally competitive environment? Successful 
regional characteristics are likely to include the following:  
 1) Efficient provision of government services (and regulations) that are desired by residents 
and businesses, including a governance structure that reflects the functional economic 
integration. The successful region will also have to weigh the tradeoffs between policies that 
firms like with those that households like and not just favor one or the other; 
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2) High levels of human capital and especially knowledge workers. This means knowing and 
responding to what would make living in the region attractive to this group of workers; and 
3) Support for entrepreneurship and innovation, where the latter is to be interpreted broadly 
including incremental innovations to help produce or develop a product. However, we note that it 
is not necessary for the region to be the ‘innovator,’ but the region needs the capacity to be able 
to adopt innovations and increase productivity. Productivity is what ultimately raises living 
standards; and  
4) Recognition of externalities that may be generated due to private sector activity or 
inactivity, and appropriate responses.  
Regional policies that produce these characteristics are the 'best bet' for sustainable regional 
development.  
Efficient provision of Government Services 
Innovations in governance can facilitate efficiencies by internalizing the range of spillovers 
and externalities that occur across existing administrative boundaries, which seldom coincide 
with FEA boundaries. For instance, there is evidence of substantial positive spatial spillovers 
from urban growth, often extending out to 100kms or more in the countryside (Partridge et al. 
2007; Barkley 1995). Internalizing these externalities will be one of the benefits of governance 
arrangements that recognize expanded FEAs. If the beneficiaries of public expenditures coincide 
closely with the taxpayers, the latter will have a vested interest in the provision of the level of 
public services needed to make the region attractive. For example, transportation improvement 
financed by taxes within a commuting shed benefits both rural commuters and urban employers. 
Similarly other public infrastructure such as libraries, schools, landfills, water and sewage, that 
serve the FEA are ideally financed from a tax base comprising the entire FEA, both for equity 
considerations and as a way of internalizing the externalities (Drabenstott et al. 2004). In 
practice, to achieve such levels of regionalism, metropolitan areas need more effective tax 
sharing. One example is the tax sharing of increased property tax valuations in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul area that reduces fiscal disparities in the region and reduces competition between 
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neighboring cities (Orfield, 1997). Overall, proponents of more regional approaches look to the 
limited successes around Portland, OR, Indianapolis, IN, and Louisville, KY as good starting 
points as providing valuable lessons for how to proceed and for the need to incorporate the entire 
region beyond the central county (e.g., Rosentraub, 2000; Muro, 2004). Of course, there are 
other complications to forming regional governance such as defining the region (which we argue 
should roughly follow commuting patterns) and developing an inclusive political process 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2008). 
It should be noted that our call for regionalism does not contradict Tiebout sorting 
arguments. We are just geographically extending them by noting that the relevant “community” 
evolves over time as technologies and transportation change. In 1950, as we have shown for our 
four case-study metropolitan areas, communities were geographically compact with fewer 
spillovers from neighbors. Today, “communities” are larger with widespread spillovers that 
produce regional communities. In these regions, individuals will continue to make their location 
choices based on their preferred level of public service provision (and taxation), but 
local/regional governments will be collecting taxes over a base that is more consistent where the 
benefits are consumed, that is, functionally integrated. Further, with the largest feasible market 
area, they will be able to realize economies of size and scale in the provision of those services. In 
these large organically formed regions, the spillovers will be internalized if governance 
structures are organized to reflect the reality on the ground. Tiebout sorting, indeed, will 
continue to favor regions based on functionally integrated areas, as the tax cost of public services 
will be at the lowest feasible level given the market size.  
In an era of tight fiscal budgets, changes in governance to reflect the regional realities of 
North American FEAs are an appealing way of improving economic outcomes without greater 
expenditures. Even so, it has long been pointed out the current governance structure is ineffective 
and does not represent the realities of modern regions. For example, Allen (1931) long ago 
argued that the province of Saskatchewan’s local governance structure was far too fragmented 
for the technologies and transportation of the 1930s and needed to be reorganized on a regional 
28 
 
 
 
basis. While Allen’s arguments were obvious and, of course, have greatly strengthened since 
1931, virtually nothing has been done. One reason is that many local policymakers feel they 
would be made redundant in regional approaches (which is undoubtedly true), and some rural 
residents have concerns about losing local control. Ironically, the status quo implies the loss of 
control. “Small box” rural governments such as townships in the Midwest and Northeast U.S. 
and rural municipalities in Canada (and even sparsely populated counties) often lack the capacity 
to effectively provide public services and conduct economic development. The status quo means 
the death of too many communities or at best, a lower standard of living and quality of life. 
High Levels of Human Capital 
The importance of human capital in any development process is certainly well-established 
(Glaeser et al. 1992, 1995, 2004; Simon 1998; Simon and Nardinelli 2002). This is perhaps 
increasingly so in the 'Knowledge Economy' where the premiums for education have been rising.  
Fostering regional capacity through providing high quality education is one of the strategies 
often advocated as a result. A well-educated local labor force is an attractive regional asset both 
for firms and households in their location decisions. Not only are educated individuals better off 
but the well-documented societal and economic spillover benefits strongly support this strategy 
(Moretti 2004). Indeed supporting institutions of higher learning has from time to time become a 
regional development strategy in itself (Andersson et al. 2004; Drabenstott et al. 2004; Goldstein 
and Renault 2004). Supporting universities is a start, but education begins very early. In this, 
early childhood education likely has the highest returns. Because early childhood education is 
good for future worker productivity and in attracting current parents interested in the education 
of their children, it is increasingly viewed as an economic development strategy that pays higher 
returns than tax abatements (Bartik, 2011). 
Human capital intensive workers are, however, highly mobile (Faggian and McCann 2009a, 
2009b), especially in a North American context (Yankow 2003). Attracting and retaining this 
coveted segment of the labor force is essential to a region poised for long term and sustainable 
success. Public services and facilities such as libraries, museums, good broadband connectivity 
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and transportation access can be instrumental both in retaining an educated population and in 
attracting others, but we caution that such strategies need to be subjected to benefit-cost analysis 
and not justified on the basis of wishful thinking.  
Within the labor force characterized by high levels of human capital, knowledge workers are 
often identified as particularly appealing, as they comprise an increasing share of the workforce. 
The occupational structure of production, across industries, is increasingly concentrated in the 
professional, managerial and administrative occupations (Autor et al. 2003; Berman et al. 1994). 
In this competition, regions need to be realistic in their aspirations. Higher-order occupations and 
jobs will likely be predisposed to locate in or near urban settings. Hence, rural communities that 
are not linked into urban-centered regions will not participate in this type of growth process and 
“going it alone” likely means a future of low-wage jobs if not outright death for those rural 
communities without other assets such as natural amenities. 
A related set of regional policies is the pursuit of the Creative Class (CC). There is a 
literature proposing that the CC, variously defined, is a desirable cohort to be courted and 
attracted (Florida 2002; Florida et al. 2008; Hansen et al. 2009; McGranahan and Wojan 2007; 
Nathan 2007). This degree of specificity in identifying a particular type of human capital may be 
unnecessary (Glaeser 2005; Olfert and Partridge, 2011; Comunian et al. 2010). As an explanation 
of why the presence of knowledge workers is important to any region, this work is instructive, 
illustrating that a 21st Century perspective that knowledge workers are mobile and regions are 
competing for them. Yet, the creative class prescription appears to have been taken too far by 
practitioners and politicians. This pattern is illustrated by trying to make downtowns attractive to 
young university educated workers in areas that have little hope of success or focusing on artistic 
Bohemians as a broad-based development strategy, both of which lacked a research basis.  
Attention to the provision of a broad range of services that improve quality of life though 
public services provision and good governance is essential for the attraction and retention of a 
high quality labor force. A physically pleasing environment, access to recreation and cultural 
amenities, safety and security and high quality transportation and communication infrastructure 
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will be demanded by the labor force that regions wish to attract. A possible caution against 
singling out local natural amenities as a strategy is that if successful, these attractions may be 
quickly capitalized into higher land prices. 
Support for Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
The third constructive regional development strategy indicated above is the support of 
entrepreneurship and innovation (Deller and McConnon, 2009; Deller forthcoming; Drabenstott 
2008; Loveridge and Nizalov, 2007; Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Goetz et al. 
forthcoming). Like the basic good governance and management policies described above, 
supporting local entrepreneurship should be standard fare, though it is often neglected in favor of 
more glamorous short term strategies such as attracting big outside firms with tax incentives. 
Providing an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and innovation includes reducing 
uncertainty about future conditions through a transparent and efficient regulatory environment, 
provision of modern transportation, communication and information services, and access to a 
skilled labor force as well as to a network of other entrepreneurs. To be clear, because successful 
entrepreneurs can be found in all industries, a region’s focus on entrepreneurs should not be 
limited to ‘hot’ or seemingly ‘advanced’ technologies because this would rule out the most 
realistic possibilities for growth for that region. 
There are other advantages of focusing on entrepreneurship and small business development 
through business retention and expansion efforts (Fleming and Goetz, forthcoming). First, small 
businesses seem to be more likely to purchase inputs locally rather than from a global supply 
chain, increasing local spillovers. Second, they are less likely to outsource or to relocate to say 
China. Third, they foster the creation of a diverse economic structure that we have already noted 
that will likely outperform regions that possess a concentrated local economic structure. Finally, 
cultivating local businesses does not require the use of potentially excessive tax incentives to 
outside firms, who in turn, may be likely to leave for greener pastures in the future. 
Externalities and Market Failures 
Where private sector investments/developments produce externalities, public policies may be 
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required to regulate or mitigate the effects. Environmental degradation and pollution are clear 
examples. Either for future economic development or current and future quality of life, policy 
interventions may be called for. Appropriate measurement and monitoring, and anticipation of 
future incidence of effects may be challenging and will require both good judgment and 
sophisticated quantitative techniques (including evaluation). The more difficult case, is the claim 
that current interventions are required to maintain or develop options for future development, or 
the support of “can’t miss” infant industries that are projected to (eventually) become self-
sufficient and regionally important industries. Retaining future options for development through 
expanding the infrastructure ("build it and they will come") is at best high risk. Justifying the 
support of new industries based on future large regional spillover effect, even more so. 
Reality Check 
There are no guarantees associated with exploiting the best policies, even if they are much 
more likely to be successful than suboptimal policies. Even if regional governments and 
residents do everything right, their region and community still may not prosper because they are 
competing with the rest of the world. Employing the best strategy is not a sufficient condition for 
success. It does not guarantee that the region will be chosen by a particular industry or household 
type, but the firms and households who do choose the region are doing so for sustainable reasons 
and will form the basis for long term growth and development that is appropriate to the region. 
To do otherwise is costly and will lead to, at best, very short term gains. 
Future Challenges for Regions.  
Beyond the regional policy recommendations proposed here, a number of new and ongoing 
challenges remain. Ongoing challenges include evolving preferences and demands of households 
and firms, as well as technological changes that alter significant relative prices, eroding existing 
competitive advantages and creating new ones. Nevertheless the region's 'Best Bet' is staying the 
course with basic and fundamental good policy, knowing that this is a necessary but not 
sufficient approach. Indeed, we do not propose silver bullets for regions in persistent decline and 
we realize the best strategies for maximizing the residents' utility may be to facilitate the process 
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of out-migration of firms and people. 
Communication and 'recruitment' may become an important regional initiative in the global 
bid for the attention, and endorsement of firms and households both local and distant. Skillfully 
tailored internet-based communication will be required where paper or other more generic media 
used to be adequate. The speed with which information can be accessed and both the aesthetic 
and substantive quality of the information can make an essential difference. Internet users, 
especially those the region would most like to retain/attract are sophisticated and time-
constrained. Yet, this does not rule out the need for word-of-mouth and personal meetings to 
facilitate communication. As one economic developer told us, potential contacts have to know a 
little about your location before they will even think to ‘Google’ your community. 
The more sinister challenges, however, are structural changes due to a range of exogenous 
forces. Among these are fundamentally binding budget constraints, changes in energy prices, and 
climate change. Although changes in budget constraints may commonly be considered more 
cyclical than structural, there may be long term public debt constraints or ideological shifts that 
limit public sector involvement in the form of regional economic development policy. Austerity 
and a reduced appetite for public sector spending may also follow from global shifts in relative 
economic growth rates. Enthusiasm for public policy could also wane due to a paucity of high 
quality accessible research detailing the conditions under which regional development policy 
may be successful. In addition, the ongoing redistribution of population will reduce the political 
(and policy) importance of some regions, especially those rural and remote.  
A second significant challenge, the specter of higher energy prices fundamentally altering 
spatial economic relationships, is not new. Even though previous periods of intense concern have 
come and gone with apparently little effect, the possibility of a reversal cannot be ignored. Yet, 
Europe has faced similar dynamics in the spatial formation of FEAs, even with significantly 
higher energy costs, implying North America is far from a transformative change in the 
evolution of FEAs due to higher energy prices. Nonetheless, regional conflicts, logistical and 
institutional failures or absolute resource depletion have the potential for major price disruptions. 
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Major sustained increases in energy prices could greatly alter relative FEA competitiveness 
through structural changes in prices and transport costs. Clearly, efforts to achieve lower energy 
usage per capita will shelter regions from such trends, while the sensible adoption of alternative 
energy sources will be appropriate when new technologies make these sources cost effective 
(including counting the full social costs of fossil fuels). However, we have already warned 
against the adoption of 'faddy' green/clean energy economic development policies that lack an 
economic basis and are instead the products of good intentions or wishful thinking.  
Perhaps of greater concern as an exogenous and pervasive influence is climate change. 
Ongoing and sustained changes in temperature, rainfall and sea levels are well documented. A 
global shift in the food productive capacity of regions is one of the obvious consequences, 
leading also to a shift in relative prices of especially fresh produce across regions. Desertification 
of some regions along with improved productivity of others is likely to result. 
While the natural environmental consequences of climate change are understood to some 
extent, at least in their broadest form, the human responses are less often alluded to in the related 
discussions. Indeed, the research agenda in North America hardly recognizes that climate change 
will greatly alter migration behavior and how it will affect the competitiveness of regions. The 
most significant force in U.S. population movements over the past 50 years has been the move to 
a “nicer” climate (Graves 1976; Rappaport 2007; Partridge 2010). Vast migration flows and 
major population redistribution has resulted. Looming climate change has the potential to trigger 
an ongoing response of at least this magnitude. Previously favorably located regions in terms of 
warm climate and natural amenities may find themselves at a disadvantage, while other regions 
may flourish. The precise dimensions and boundaries of these effects may not be clear, but the 
general pattern is now known. For example, it is conceivable that states such as Florida or 
Arizona will be viewed unfavorably in terms of natural amenities while states such as Minnesota 
or Michigan may be viewed more favorably. 
Reinforcing such migration trends is the tremendous change in infrastructure and government 
expenditures that would be needed in certain locations. For example, coastal regions will likely 
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have to relocate infrastructure due to rising sea levels, which is costly. Of course, this will 
require higher taxes, which will make these regions less competitive, which will be further 
reinforced if there are fewer and fewer people to support such government funding. We could see 
Sunbelt locations entering a vicious downward spiral that has afflicted Rustbelt locations since 
the 1970s. Others may disagree indicating a need for a climate change research program that 
considers the relocation of businesses and people versus one that is more static. In examining 
future competitiveness of regions, climate change cannot be ignored. 
In this environment of ongoing, and potentially new and dramatic changes, it is even more 
important for regions to avoid the temptation to 'pick the winners' in terms of particular 
industries or clusters, or the flavor of the month. Given the uncertainties in the world, the 
chances of succeeding in that game in an increasingly global, open and changing environment 
would seem to be lower than ever before, while the opportunity costs are likely to be very high 
as “losing” regions will face outflows to the rest of the world.  
Implications 
To understand the overarching spatial dynamics of economic growth, it is essential to 
understand the geographically large (and growing) rural-urban economic regions where 
economic activity takes place. These regions have greatly expanded since the 1950s, increasingly 
incorporating rural areas that previously had only marginal linkages to urban areas. A clear 
implication of the rise of bigger ‘mega’ regions is that federal, state/provincial, and local 
development policy design should, in general, abandon the distinction of ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ (and 
then trying to define rural and urban). If people and businesses have long reorganized themselves 
on the basis of regions, then economic development policies should also be conducted on a 
regional basis. For example, rather than urban development policies being handled in U.S. 
Housing and Urban Development and rural development policies being handled in USDA Rural 
Development (along with scattered development functions in the Commerce, Labor, and 
Transportation Departments), it is time for a new U.S. Department of Regional Development to 
take the lead. There are entrenched interests that would fight such a reorganization, but federal 
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policy should be aimed at internalizing economic spillovers and maximizing economic 
performance rather than supporting rent seeking and outdated notions of economic development. 
Indeed, the current artificial distinction between rural and urban economic development slows 
the needed institutional adjustments to support regionalization. Why should rural-urban regions 
work together when policy is divided between them? 
In adopting regional policies, successful regions are unlikely to be the ones that “pick 
winners” and offer subsidies and tax breaks to lure them. Policymakers have a dismal track 
record in picking winners and the tax incentives have a corrosive impact on the broader 
economy. Rather, policy should build a foundation that would attract the “winners” of the 21st 
Century. A region (or anyone else for that matter) may not know what will be the future strategic 
industries or firms, but they should create a climate such that the winners will choose their region 
because that is where these firms will be the most competitive (including being able to attract a 
capable workforce). A stronger foundation requires effective governance with high-quality 
service provision at a low tax-price, a setting conducive to attraction/retention/creation of 
knowledge workers, and facilitating and promoting entrepreneurial activities. And if the region, 
having conducted sound policy and good governance, is chosen by none or few, that is likely 
because the region is uncompetitive in the new reality. If true, it could surely only be made 
worse by expending public money trying to recruit outside firms against all odds, and in the end 
simply not meeting the necessary conditions and being even worse off. 
Supporting innovation—broadly defined to include incremental innovations in process and 
product—is also helpful, but we caution that the ultimate goal should be higher productivity as 
that is what raises living standards. That is, the benefits of innovation can trickle out of a region 
by other adopters, while a region can be successful by being earlier adopters of best practice. 
Hence, having knowledge workers who can adopt best practice and new innovation is 
paramount. Likewise, export-based approaches are neither necessary nor sufficient for prosperity 
(Kilkenny and Partridge 2009). There are many examples of this such as the Great Plains region 
of North America being a major agricultural exporter despite wide-scale population loss. 
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Similarly, the Rustbelt has long been a major exporter though it has had a mostly stagnant 
economy (picture Detroit). Again, regardless of whether a region exports or not, the clear path to 
prosperity is high productivity. Finally, this brings us back to the conclusion that regions need to 
build from within by promoting their existing entrepreneurs and small businesses rather than the 
current overreliance on ‘faddy’ policies and landing big firms to the region. 
Globalization and climate change will be two key challenges facing the competitiveness of 
North American regions. Globalization in conjunction with capital mobility and lower 
transport/communication costs raises the stakes of competitiveness. Small gaps in 
competitiveness mean that regions either pull resources from the rest of the world or lose their 
own productive resources. Getting it right becomes even more important in the global 
environment. Climate change has the potential to unwind the amenity migration that has driven 
Sunbelt growth. Not only will Sunbelt climates will be relatively less appealing, but rising sea 
levels and other factors will make it necessary to relocate infrastructure, which would be costly, 
making affected regions even less appealing. The possibility of major regional alignments cannot 
be dismissed, raising the question of whether American rural-urban regions are prepared. Going 
forward, focusing attention on how globalization and climate change will affect the productivity, 
competitiveness and realignment of North American regions is of urgent importance.
                                                       
END NOTES 
i They report that the average cost of moving a ton a mile fell from 18.5 cents in 1890 to 2.3 cents in 2001 (in 2001 
dollars). Also see Partridge (2010) on the long-run decline of transportation costs. 
iiForming the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Gainesville CSA is the Atlanta MSA in figure 1 along with the Gainesville, 
GA MSA and the La Grange, GA, Thomaston, GA, and Valley, AL micropolitan areas. Forming the Columbus-
Marion-Chillicothe CSA is the Columbus MSA along with the Chillicothe, OH, Marion, OH and Washington, OH 
micropolitan areas. The Des Moines-Newton CSA includes the Des Moines MSA and the Newton, IA micropolitan 
area. The Minneapolis-St. Paul-St. Cloud, MN-WI CSA contains the Minneapolis St. Paul MSA, the St. Cloud, MN 
MSA and the Faribault, MN, Hutchinson, MN, and Red Wing, MN micropolitan areas. 
iiiThe formal definition of an urban area as defined by the US Census Bureau is:   
1. A cluster of one or more block groups or census blocks, each of which has a population density of at least 1,000 
people per square mile at the time; 
2. Surrounding block groups and census blocks, each of which has a population density of at least 500 people per 
square mile at the time; and 
3. Less densely settled blocks that form enclaves or indentations, or are used to connect discontiguous areas with 
qualifying densities. Source: www.census.gov. 
ivBy comparison, U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that the overall nonmetropolitan rural farm population share was 
3.8% in 2000.  
vConversely, Grassmueck et al. (2008) find no evidence that government fragmentation in Pennsylvania contributes 
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to youth out-migration. 
viWe are not arguing that the world is flat and that distance is dead. Specifically, Leamer (2007) provides persuasive 
arguments that distance is alive and well in international commerce. However, in the key dimensions we describe, 
communities are increasingly competing and functioning in a global context. 
viiSome other examples of regional resilience to economic shocks are as follows. First, the New Economic 
Geography spawned studies of man-made disasters. For example, Davis and Weinstein (2002) found that rather 
devastating Allied bombing campaigns on particular Japanese cities had little influence on their long-run growth 
paths measured 10-12 years later. Likewise, evidence suggests that natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes 
have a temporary impact on the growth path of affected areas (e.g., Xiao, forthcoming). Similarly, new plant 
openings have only a modest impact on local labor markets (Edmiston, 2004; Kilkenny and Partridge, 2009), while 
communities that experienced military base closings may have actually fared better in the long run (Poppert and 
Herzog, 2003). The point is that underlying growth is determined by the long-run economic fundamentals, not short-
term events like plant openings. 
viiiResidents and responsive policymakers are obviously interested in broader quality of life. That is, residents are 
interested in maximizing utility (not just economic outcomes) as articulated in the core of the spatial equilibrium 
approach that is central to regional and urban economic modeling in North America (Roback 1982; Glaeser and 
Gottlieb 2008; Partridge 2010).  
ixA clear worst-case example is Rio Ranchero, New Mexico’s successful $290 million bid to lure an Intel plant in 
1993. The city did not account for the need to provide public services when it made its bid. As a result, Intel had to 
drill its own well for water supply, while the city was left with an overstressed water system, schools that were 60-
90% overcapacity, and the city lacked bonding capacity (Schweke, 2009). Another egregious example is “job 
poaching” where nearby communities steal jobs from one another using various incentive deals—e.g., tax incentives 
are used to lure (say) a Wal-Mart from one city to another neighboring community. No net wealth is created, but the 
‘loser’ city loses tax revenues and the winner also may lose tax revenue due to the incentive deal. It is unclear how 
the region benefits from such behavior.  See Lynch (2010) for other examples of local governments overbidding for 
new firms and losing needed tax revenue. 
x Localization economies stand in contrast with urbanization economies which are more related to positive spillovers 
of locating in a larger city regardless of the size of the sector. 
xiGordan and McCann (2000) provide simpler classifications for clusters. While these classifications are 
pedagogically useful in an academic setting, it would be very difficult to use them for policymaking.  
xiiFor a discussion of the U.S. Economic Development Administration’s cluster policy, see 
http://www.eda.gov/AboutEDA/RIC/ (accessed on October 6, 2010). Discussion of U.S. Small Business 
Administration cluster policy can be found in Rahman (2010). 
xiiiLikewise, the pharmaceutical industry lost about 1.0% employment over the period illustrating that biotechnology 
strategies of the past decade were also far from fool-proof. The source for this employment data is the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics website, www.bls.gov [downloaded October 10, 2010]. 
xivIf one is committed to matching, we would be much more persuaded by a matching strategy that finds the 
counterfactual using traditional matching strategies based on ‘economic distance’ from the winner using all U.S. 
counties in the sample, or counties in the winner’s geographical region. This would help purge endogeneity such as 
the possibility that ‘losers’ are inherently different because of their willingness to offer large tax incentives. 
xvSpecifically, for each individual year between 2005 and 2009, we regressed annual employment growth in the year 
of announcement on the per-capita million dollar facilities. We then regressed annual employment growth in the 
year after announcement on per-capita million-dollar facilities. Finally, we repeated this by focusing on million-
dollar manufacturing facilities in isolation, all with the same outcome of no statistically significant relationship. 
Note that Site Selection Magazine includes a facility in this database if there is either a US$1 million or more in 
building costs or lease costs per year and either create 50 or more new jobs or involve 20,000 square feet (1,860 sq. 
m.) or more of new space. They added the $1million lease threshold in their 2008 data. 
xviAnother related craze (fad?) in economic development is the so-called “public-private partnerships.” They can 
span a wide range of initiatives from research collaborations between business and education to redevelopment of 
neighborhoods. Thus, they are hard to uniformly label as “good” or “bad.” Yet, we worry that such initiatives too 
often appear to be a relabeling to draw attention away from the use of government subsidies and tax abatements, 
while much of the project’s risk is borne by the public and the profits go to favored private interests. In this case, 
many of the criticisms of tax incentives apply. 
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Table 1. Trade centre hierarchy evolution, Saskatchewan, Canada, 1961-2001 
 1961 1981 1991 1995 2001 
Primary Wholesale-Retail 2 2 2 2 2 
Secondary Wholesale-Retail 8 8 8 8 8 
Complete Shopping Center 29 22 6 7 8 
Partial Shopping Center 99 30 46 22 6 
Full Convenience Center 189 136 117 59 72 
Minimum Convenience Center 271 400 419 500 502 
Total 598 598 598 598 598 
Source: Stabler, Jack C. and M. Rose Olfert. 2002. Saskatchewan's Communities in the 21st Century: from Places to 
Regions. Regina, SK: Canadian Plains Research Centre, University of Regina. 
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Table 2. MSA evolution, 1950-2009, Atlanta, Columbus, Des Moines and Minneapolis-St. Paul 
 Group 1: MSA 
in 1950 
Group 2: Counties 
added 1950-73 
Group 3: Counties 
added 1974-2003 
Total MSA in 
2003 
Panel a: Population Size and Shares 
Atlanta: # of counties  
              1950 Population 
              % of 1950 pop., 2003 MSA boundary  
              % of 2009 pop., 2003 MSA boundary 
              2009 Population 
3 
671,797 
      62.24% 
      45.58% 
2,495,722 
12 
192,665 
      17.85% 
      42.71% 
2,338,275 
13 
214,862 
      19.91% 
      11.71% 
641,216 
28 
1,079,324 
      100.00% 
      100.00% 
5,475,213 
Columbus: # of counties  
              1950 Population 
              % of 1950 pop., 2003 MSA boundary  
              % of 2009 pop., 2003 MSA boundary 
              2009 Population 
1 
503,410 
      67.48% 
      63.83% 
1,150,122 
4 
134,060 
      17.97% 
      22.74% 
409,693 
3 
108,500 
      14.54% 
      13.43% 
242,033 
8 
745,970 
      100.00% 
      100.00% 
1,801,848 
Des Moines: # of counties  
              1950 Population 
              % of 1950 pop., 2003 MSA boundary  
              % of 2009 pop., 2003 MSA boundary 
              2009 Population 
1 
226,010 
      76.42% 
      76.29% 
429,439 
1 
17,758 
        6.00% 
        8.04% 
45,275 
3 
51,898 
      17.58% 
      15.67% 
88,192 
5 
295,757 
      100.00% 
      100.00% 
562,906 
Minneapolis-St. Paul: # of counties  
              1950 Population               
              % of 1950 pop., 2003 MSA boundary  
              % of 2009 pop., 2003 MSA boundary 
              2009 Population 
4 
1,116,509 
      84.14% 
      73.11% 
2,390,572 
5 
118,989 
        9.18% 
      17.74% 
579,948 
4 
60,718 
        4.68% 
        9.15% 
299,294 
13 
1,296,216 
      100.00% 
      100.00% 
3,269,814 
Panel b: Population Density 
Atlanta: No. of Sq. Miles 
              1950 Population Density 
              2009 Population Density 
1,150mi.2 
   584.16 
2,170.14 
3,233mi.2 
  59.60 
723.30 
4,097mi.2 
52.44  
156.49  
8,480mi.2 
127.27 
645.64 
Columbus: No. Sq. Miles 
              1950 Population Density 
              2009 Population Density 
543mi.2 
   926.54 
2,116.84 
1,938mi.2 
 69.19 
211.45    
1,533mi.2 
  70.79   
157.91 
4,014mi.2 
185.86 
448.94 
Des Moines: No. Sq. Miles 
              1950 Population Density 
              2009 Population Density 
592mi.2 
    381.84 
    725.53 
573mi.2 
30.98 
78.99 
1,747mi.2 
   29.76  
  50.48 
2,912mi.2 
101.56 
193.29 
Minneapolis-St. Paul: No. Sq. Miles 
              1950 Population Density 
              2009 Population Density 
1,809mi.2 
  617.16 
1,321.42 
2,692mi.2 
  44.20 
215.43 
1,863mi.2 
32.59 
160.65   
6,364mi.2 
203.68 
513.79 
Panel c: Urbanization intensity 
Atlanta: 2000 %in urban areas 
              2000 %in nonfarm rural areas 
              2000 %on rural farms 
98.92% 
  1.06 
  0.02 
83.16% 
16.63 
  0.22 
42.53% 
56.12 
  1.34 
86.16% 
13.59 
  0.25 
Columbus: 2000 %in urban areas 
              2000 %in nonfarm rural areas 
              2000 %on rural farms 
98.16% 
   1.78 
   0.06 
61.16% 
36.75 
   2.08 
49.51% 
47.40 
3.09 
84.11% 
15.01 
0.88 
Des Moines: 2000 %in urban areas 
              2000 %in nonfarm rural areas 
              2000 %on rural farms 
94.20% 
  5.35 
  0.45 
58.55% 
36.39 
  5.06 
39.83% 
52.75 
  7.42 
83.72% 
14.49 
  1.80 
Minneapolis-St. Paul: 2000 %in urban areas 
              2000 %in nonfarm rural areas 
              2000 %on rural farms 
96.01% 
  3.84 
  0.14 
65.04% 
32.66 
  2.29 
52.08% 
44.78 
  3.14 
87.87% 
11.43 
  0.70 
Sources: Population: U.S. Census Bureau. 1950, 1980 Census Counts, 2000, 2009 Population estimates. Area:  1950, 1980 U.S. 
Census Bureau. Census Counts; 2000, 2009 U.S. Census Bureau. Population Estimates. Area: U.S. Census Bureau, Fact finder, 
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Basic Counts/Population. Urban/rural: U.S. Census Bureau, Fact finder, Detailed tables/Geography. 
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Figure 1. Commuting rates around Edmonton, Alberta in Canada, 1981 and 2001 
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Figure 2. The evolving Metropolitan Statistical Areas 1950-2003 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Figure 3. State Employment Growth on Announced Per-Capita Million Dollar Facilities 
Panel a. 2008-2010 Employment Growth 
 
Panel b. 2006-2007 Employment Growth 
 
Panel c. 2009-2010 Employment Growth 
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Notes: The number of facilities is from various March issues of Site Selection Magazine, www.siteselection.com. State population 
data is from the U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.com, and employment data is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
www.bls.gov. All data was downloaded on February 22, 2011. 
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